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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
The survey year produced forty-two family law appellate decisions.
Of that number, sixteen are digested here. Three cases and new
legislation require strict application of the child support guidelines. Two
decisions refine the theory of equitable division of property. Grandparents can no longer seek judicially proscribed visitation rights. Parents
can now be directed to insure their lives for the benefit of their minor
children.
1. DIVORCE
A

EquitableDivision
In Bass v. Bass' the jury awarded Mrs. Bass a portion of her
husband's interest in a family corporation. Because Mr. Bass had been
given his fifty-one percent interest in the enterprise, he argued that the
property was separate and the issue of its division was erroneously
submitted to the jury.' The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
question of whether the husband's interest was marital property was a
mixed question of law and fact and affirmed the lower court's decision.'
Retreating somewhat from its reasoning in Goldstein v. Goldstein,4 the
court stated:
[Tihe classification of property as either marital or non-marital is not
always exclusively a question of law. What items of property can
legally constitute a marital or nonmarital asset is a question of law for
the court. However, whether a particular item of property actually
*

Shareholder in the firm of Frankel, Hardwick, Tanenbaum & Fink, P.C., Atlanta,

Georgia. University of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B.,
1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 264 Ga. 506, 448 S.E.2d 366 (1994).
2. Id. at 506, 448 S.E.2d at 367.
3. Id: at 508, 448 S.E.2d at 368.
4. 262 Ga. 136, 414 S.E.2d 474 (1992).
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constitutes a marital or nonmarital asset may be a question of fact for
the trier of fact to determine from the evidence.5

In the instant case, the plaintiff failed to allege that the appreciation in
the value of the husband's interest arose solely from market forces.6
Accordingly, the question of what portion of that interest was marital
was for the jury. 7 Janelle v. Janelle' applied the rule in Bass9 to the
issue of alleged appreciation in a premarital corporation and the marital
residence.' ° The court noted that contentions regarding time of
acquisition of the residence and funds used for its purchase were within

the province of the source of funds rule."
B.

Alimony

The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered a divorce decree
awarding the wife permanent alimony in Allen v. Allen. 2 The decree,
"provided that the 'alimony payments shall not terminate upon the
remarriage of the Plaintiff or upon-her cohabitation in a meretricious

relationship ...
The supreme court held that the trial court had
not exceeded its authority but construed the cohabitation clause "to
mean that such cohabitation does not create a self-executing termination
"."

of the alimony obligation."14

Since the decree did not prohibit future

5. 264 Ga. at 507-08, 448 S.E.2d at 367-68.
6. Id. at 508, 448 S.E.2d at 368.
7. Id, By way of dicta, the supreme court stated:
So as to provide the jury with the applicable legal guidelines in making this
determination, it would have been proper for the trial court to have instructed the
jury: that it should first find whether appreciation, if any, in Husband's interest
in the corporation during the marriage was attributable to his or Wife's individual
or joint efforts or to market forces; that any appreciation found to be attributable
to market forces would not be a marital asset subject to equitable division, but
would remain his separate non-marital asset; that any appreciation found to be
attributable to his or Wife's individual or joint efforts would be a marital asset
subject to equitable division; and, that, as a marital asset, any appreciation found
to be attributable to his or Wife's individual or joint efforts should be equitably
divided between them. We believe that, in all cases involving appreciation of
otherwise non-marital assets, such instructions would be helpful to the jury and
the litigants.
Id.
8. 265 Ga. 116, 454 S.E.2d 133 (1995).
9. See generally 264 Ga. 506, 448 S.E.2d 366.
10. See 265 Ga. 116, 454 S.E.2d 133.
11. Id. at 117, 454 S.E.2d at 133. See Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 377 S.E.2d 666
(1989).
12. 265 Ga. 53, 452 S.E.2d 767 (1995).
13. Id. at 53, 452 S.E.2d at 767.
14. Id. at 54, 452 S.E.2d at 768.
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modification of the alimony obligations, the trial court had not abused
its discretion.15 A divorce jury awarded the wife no alimony, but did
equitably divide property in Andrews v. Whitaker.16 The husband was
required to pay the wife one half of his retirement pay, to purchase an
annuity for her, and to provide her with two tickets to the Masters Golf
Tournament every odd-numbered year. The wife remarried and the
husband brought a declaratory judgment action, contending his
obligations were periodic alimony payments which were terminated by
her remarriage. The trial court denied the husband relief. 7 The
appellate court affirmed as to the retirement pay but found the other
obligations to be of an indefinite duration, and accordingly, alimony
which was terminated by the wife's remarriage.1"
C. Enforcement
In Bryant v. Employees Retirement Systems,19 a divorce decree which

ordered a nonparty state agency to pay to the wife a portion of her
husband's retirement benefits was not enforceable against the agency.20
Pension plans for employees of state governments are not subject to the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984.21 Although state retirement benefits
which are marital property are divisible at divorce, there is no statute
permitting transfer of the employee's rights to another person.2 The
employee spouse can be ordered to pay the benefits to the nonemployee
spouse after receipt.23 In Parker v.Eason, ' the former wife sought
to enforce a ten-year-old child support judgment by citation for contempt.
The former husband defended on the ground that the judgment was
dormant.25 The contempt pleadings did not seek revival of the judgment.2" The court reversed the trial court's holding that the contempt

15. Id.
16. 265 Ga. 76, 453 S.E.2d 735 (1995).
17. Id. at 76, 453 S.E.2d at 735.
18. Id. at 76-77, 453 S.E.2d at 736. The court overruled Fisher v. Fredrickson, 262 Ga.
229, 416 S.E.2d 512 (1992), to the extent it held payment of retirement benefits was an

alimony obligation. TheAndrews court found the benefits to be deferred compensation for
services performed during the marriage. Accordingly, the benefits were property to be
divided.
19.

216 Ga. App. 737, 455 S.E.2d 839 (1995).

20. Id. at 738, 455 S.E.2d at 841.
21. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(bXl), 1002(32) (1985 & Supp. 1995).
22. 216 Ga. App. 738-39, 455 S.E.2d at 841.
23. Id. at 738, 455 S.E.2d at 841.
24. 265 Ga. 236, 454 S.E.2d 460 (1995).
25. Id. at 236-37, 454 S.E.2d at 460. See O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 (1991).
26. 265

Ga. at 236-37, 454 S.E.2d at 460. See O.C.G.A. § 9-12-61 (1991).
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citation was an action for revival.2 7 The court remanded the case for
determination of which unpaid amounts were more than seven years old
and therefore unenforceable.2" The majority opinion is unclear as to
whether a prayer for revival would suffice. However, the special
concurrence stated that only an action for revival or an application for
a writ of scire facias is legally sufficient.2" In Paul v. Paul," the
reach of the long-arm statute31 was not long enough to hold on to the
former wife's contempt action for past due alimony.3 2 The trial court
erred in denying the former husband's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction where the parties had lived in Georgia for less than
a year before they ended their twenty-two year marriage and where
neither party was a Georgia resident at the time of the filing of the
contempt proceeding.33
II.

CHILDREN

Child Support
The child support guidelines3 4 were repeatedly underscored during
the survey year. In Ehlers v. Ehlers,35 the supreme court remanded an
order modifying downward the former husband's child support obligation.3 6 The trial court found a substantial decrease in the former
husband's income and a substantial increase in the income of the former
wife but made no finding of special circumstances in setting the new
award.3" The supreme court held that the trial court must make
written findings of special circumstances in order to deviate, up or down,
from the child support guidelines.38 Moreover, the court found that
"indirect payments," such as insurance premiums, can only be used to
vary the guideline's required support award which is ascertained by
multiplying the applicable statutory percentage by the obligor's gross
A.

27. 265 Ga. at 237, 454 S.E.2d at 460.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id., 454 S.E.2d at 461.
Id. at 238, 454 S.E.2d at 461 (Carley, J., concurring).
264 Ga. 234, 444 S.E.2d 770 (1994).
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(5) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
264 Ga. at 435, 454 S.E.2d at 771.

33. Id. at 434, 454 S.E.2d at 771. The former husband had not lived in Georgia since
1979 and the former wife had been a Florida resident for more than four years.
34. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
35. 264 Ga. 668, 449 S.E.2d 840 (1994).

36. Id. at 671, 449 S.E.2d at 843.
37.
38.

Id. at 668, 449 S.E.2d at 842.
Id. at 669, 449 S.E.2d at 842.
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income. 9 Finally, the support obligation is to be based on the number
of children for whom support is to be ordered in the proceeding.'
If
the obligor has additional children, such obligations can vary the final
award.4
In Faulkner v. Frampton,42 the court remanded the trial
court's upward modification of child support for the determination of the
obligor's gross income and a calculation of the required support
award.4
In Pearson v. Pearson," the trial court approved an oral
settlement agreement which increased the obligor's child support
obligation.4" Because the order did not find that changed financial
circumstances existed, did not review the agreement in light of the child
support guidelines, and did not contain written findings of special
circumstances, the case was reversed and remanded for further
consideration.46 Miller v. Tashie47 shifted the focus away from the
guidelines.4"
In that case, the trial court dismissed the former
husband's petition for downward modification. Since the divorce of the
parties, the former husband's income had increased.4 9 The supreme
court held the increase in income was only part of the financial
circumstances which might justify a modification and did not alone bar
the action.5"
B.

Child Custody

In the divorce action in Ivey v. Ivey,5" the custody of two minor
children was at issue. The wife had adopted the oldest child who came
from the husband's previous marriage. The trial court awarded custody
of both children to the wife. 2 The supreme court rejected the father's
argument that the biological parent should be rebuttably presumed
entitled to custody.53 The court found the test in such a case to be "the
same as in any child custody case, i.e., what is in the best interest of the

39.
40.
1995).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 670, 449 S.E.2d at 842-43. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
264 Ga. at 670, 449 S.E.2d at 843. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(bX5) (1991 & Supp.
264 Ga. at 670-71, 449 S.E.2d at 843.
216 Ga. App. 785, 456 S.E.2d 88 (1995).
Id. at 785, 456 S.E.2d at 89.
265 Ga. 100, 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995).
Id. at 100, 454 S.E.2d at 125.
Id. at 101, 454 S.E.2d at 125.
265 Ga. 147, 454 S.E.2d 498 (1995).
Id. at 147, 454 S.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 147-48, 454 S.E.2d at 498-99.
Id. at 149 n.2, 454 S.E.2d at 499 n.2.
264 Ga. 435, 445 S.E.2d 258 (1994).
Id. at 435, 445 S.E.2d at 258.
Id. at 437, 445 S.E.2d at 260.
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5 custody had been awarded to
child."5 4 In Villenueve v. Richbourg,"
the paternal great grandmother when the parents divorced. Ten years
later the mother sought to modify the award contending that the thirdparty custodian had the burden of proof because the mother had never
been found to be unfit. The trial court denied the mother's petition and
the appellate court affirmed. 6 The parent's prima facie right to
custody was lost upon the award of permanent custody to a third party,
thereby reversing the roles of the parties., 7 The absence of findings of
the mother's unfitness in the original custody order did not change the
result because the mother waived those findings.5" In another case, the
trial court changed the mother's joint physical custody to primary
physical custody where the weekly shuttling between the homes of the
parents was confusing and distressing the child.59 The appellate court
affirmed, applying the any evidence rule.6 ° In Turner v. Wright,61 the
father of an illegitimate child was held to have lost his "opportunity
interest" to develop a relationship with the child.62 Although the father
brought his petition to legitimate one month after the child's birth, the
court was clearly influenced by his lengthy criminal record, history of
drug and alcohol'involvement, and inability to hold a job."3 The court's
finding that the father lost his right to establish a family relationship by
reason of his criminal conduct is significant. 4 The court stated, "[in
the present case, after Turner was aware he was to be a father, he

voluntarily committed criminal acts ....

[His] disregard of his

opportunity interest during Wright's pregnancy is as significant as such
a disregard after the child is born." 65
C.

Visitation

The grandparent visitation statute was held unconstitutional in
66 The maternal grandmother brought an original
Brooks v. Parkerson.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(1995).

Id. See O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(aX2) (1991).
217 Ga. App. 354, 457 S.E.2d 821 (1995).
Id. at 354, 457 S.E.2d at 822.
Id. at 355, 457 S.E.2d at 823.
Id.
In the Interest of S.D.J., 215 Ga. App. 779, 779-80, 452 S.E.2d 155, 156 (1994).
Id. at 780-81, 452 S.E.2d at 157.
217 Ga. App. 368, 457 S.E.2d 575 (1995).
Id. at 369, 457 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 370, 457 S.E.2d at 577.
See id.
Id. at 369, 457 S.E.2d at 576.
265 Ga. 189, 194, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774, petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3908
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action for visitation under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.67 Both
of the child's parents opposed the action. The trial court denied the
parents' motion to dismiss which challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. 68 The supreme court struck down the statute holding that it
neither clearly promoted the health or welfare of children nor required
a showing of harm to children before state interference in their parentchild relationship.6 9 The court observed the absence of a body of
evidence which shows that the relationship of grandparent and child is
always or even predominantly beneficial to the child.7 °
III.

LEGISLATION

Once again the General Assembly amended the child support
guidelines. This year the changes were more extensive than usual but
primarily were designed to ensure strict compliance with the statute.
The General Assembly revised O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b) 71 to require
written findings of the gross incomes of the father and mother and the
presence or absence of special circumstances per O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)
in the final verdict or judgment and in agreements of the parties.72 As
a corollary to the amendment to the guidelines statute, the legislature
revised O.C.G.A. § 19-5-12 73 to change the form of the final judgment
and decree of divorce and to require juries to answer special interrogatories when child support is being determined.74 A new statute was
passed authorizing the court to order either or both parents to obtain
and maintain insurance on their lives for the benefit of their minor
children in child support cases.7 The obligation to maintain insurance
is terminable on the same conditions as other child support obligations.76

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

265 Ga. at 189-90, 454 S.E.2d at 770.
Id.
Id. at 194, 454 S.E.2d at 774.
Id., 454 S.E.2d at 773.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
Id.; O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
O.C.G.A. § 19-5-12 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
Id.
Id. § 19-6-34 (Supp. 1995).
Id.

